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Abstract – In this article we describe the trials and tribulations in the early stages to 
introduce cashless retail payments in the USA. We compare efforts by financial 
service firms and retailers. We then document the ephemeral life of one of these 
innovations, colloquially known as “Hinky Dinky”. We conclude with a brief reflection 
on the lessons these historical developments offer to the future of digital payments. 
 
Let’s go back to the last quarter of the 20th century. This was a time when 
high economic growth in the USA that followed the end of World War II was coming 
to an end, replaced by economic crisis and high inflation. It was a time where cash 
was king, and close to 23% of Americans worked in manufacturing. A time when the 
suburbs – to which Americans had increasingly flocked after 1945 escaping city 
centres – were starting to change. Opportunities for greater mobility were offered by 
automobiles, commercial airlines, buses, and the extant railway infrastructure. 
This was the period that witnessed the dawn of the digital era in the United 
States, as information and communication technologies began to emerge and grow. 
The potential of digitalisation provided the context in which an evocative idea, the 
idea of a cashless society first began to emerge. This idea was associated primarily 
with the elimination of paper forms of payment (primarily personal checks) and the 
adoption of computer technology in banking during the mid-1950s (Bátiz-Lazo et al., 
2014). Here it is worth noting that, although there is some disagreement as to the 
exact figure, the volume of paper checks cleared within the U.S. had at least doubled 
between 1939 and 1955, and the expectation was, that this would continue to rise. 
This spectacular rise in check volume, with no corresponding increase in the value of 
deposits, placed a severe strain on the U.S. banking system and lead to a number of 
industry-specific innovations emerging from the 1950s such as the so-called ERMA 
and electronic ink characters (Bátiz-Lazo and Wood, 2002). 
The concept of the cashless, checkless society became popularised in the 
press on both sides of the Atlantic in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Very soon the 
idea grew to include paper money. At the core of this imagined state was the 
digitalization of payments at the point of sale, a payment method that involved both 
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competition and co-operation between retailers and banks (Maixé-Altés, 2020 and 
2021). 
In the banking and financial industry new, transformative technologies thus 
began to be trialled and developed in order to make this a reality (Maixé-Altés, 
2019). Financial institutions accepting retail deposits had been at the forefront of the 
adoption of commercial applications of computer technology (Bátiz-Lazo et al., 
2011). Early forms of such technical devices mainly focused on improving “back 
office” operations and encompassed punch card electromechanical tabulators in the 
1920s and 1930s; later, in the 1950s, analogue devices (such as the NCR Post 
Tronic of 1962) were introduced, and, in the late 1960s the IBM 360 became widely 
adopted.  But at the same time, regulation curtailed diversification of products and 
geography (limiting the service banks could provide their customers). These 
regulatory restrictions help to explain ongoing experiments with a number of devices 
which involved a significant degree of consumer interaction including credit cards 
(Stearns, 2011), the use of pneumatic tubes and CCTV in drive through lanes, home 
banking, and Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), which despite being first 
introduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s, would ultimately not gain acceptance 
until the early 1980s (Bátiz-Lazo, 2018). 
Like the banking and financial industry, the retail industry, with its very real 
interest in point of sale digitalization, was exposed to the rise of digital technology in 
the last quarter of the 20th Century. The digitalisation of retailing occurred later than 
in other industries in the American economy (for a European account see Maixé-
Altés and Castro Balguer, 2015). Once it arrived, however, the adoption of a range of 
digital technologies including Point of Sale (POS) related innovations such as optical 
scanning, and the universal product code (UPC), were extensive and transformed 
the industry (Cortada, 2003). From the perspective of historical investigation, the 
chronological place of such innovation, beginning in the mid-1970s, is associated 
with a remarkable period of rapid technological change in U.S. retailing (Basker, 
2012; Bucklin 1980). Along with rapid technological change, shifts in the structure of 
retail markets, in particular the decline of single “mom and pop stores” and the 
ascent of retail chains also became more pronounced in the 1970s (Jarmin, Klimek 
and Miranda, 2009). Two decades later, such large, retail firms would account for 
more than 50% of the total investment in all information technology by U.S. retailers 
(Doms, Jarmin and Kilmek, 2004).   
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What connects the transformative technological changes that occurred in both 
the banking industry and the retail industry during this period, is that both sought to 
utilise Electronic Funds Transfer Systems, or EFTS, a way to reduce frictions for 
retail payments at the point of sale. During the 1970s and 1980s, the term EFTS was 
used in a number of ways. Somewhat confusingly, it was applied indistinctively to 
specific devices or ensembles, value exchange networks, and what today we 
denominate as infrastructures and platforms.  While referring to it as a systems 
technology for payments it was defined as one:  
“in which the processing and communications necessary to effect economic 
exchange and the processing and communications necessary for the 
production and distribution of services incidental to economic exchange are 
dependent wholly or in large part on the use of electronics” (National 
Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer, 1977, 1).   
Ultimately EFTS would come to be extended to the point of sale and embodied in 
terminals which allowed for automatic, digital, seamless transfer of money from the 
buyer’s current account to the retailer’s, known as the Electronic Funds Transfer at 
the Point of Sale, or EFTS-POS (Dictionary of Business and Management: 2016).   
One of the factors that initially held back the adoption of early EFTS and the 
equipment that utilities it, was the lack of infrastructure that would connect the user, 
the retailer, and the bank (or wherever the user’s funds were stored). As Bátiz-Lazo 
et al. (2014) note the idea of a cashless economy that would provide this 
infrastructure was highly appealing… but implementing its actual configuration was 
highly problematic. Indeed, in contrast to developments in Europe, some lawmakers 
in Congress considered the idea of sharing infrastructure by banks as a competitive 
anathema (Sprague, 1977). Large retailers such as Sears had a national presence 
and were able to consider implementing their own solution to the infrastructure 
problem. Small banks looked at proposals by the likes of Citibank with scepticism 
while they feared it may pivot the dominance of large banks.  George W. Mitchell 
(1904-1997), a member of the Board of the Federal Reserve, and management 
consultant John Diebold (1926-2005), were outspoken promoters of the adoption of 
cashless solutions but their lobbying of public and private spheres was not always 
successful. Perhaps the biggest chasm between banks and retailers though, resulted 
from the capital-intensive nature of the potential network and infrastructure that any 
form of EFTS required.  
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 Amongst the alternative solutions that were trialled by banks and retailers, 
there were a number of successes, such as ATMs (Bátiz-Lazo, 2018) and credit 
cards (Ritzer, 2001; Stearns, 2011). Both bankers and retailers were quick to see a 
potential connection between the machine-readable cards and the rapid spread of 
new bank-issued credit cards under the new Interbank Association (i.e., the genesis 
of Mastercard) and the Bankamericard licensing system (i.e., the genesis of Visa), 
both of which began in 1966, just as the vision of the cashless society was winning 
acceptance. Surveys from the time indicate that at least 70 percent of bankers 
believed that credit cards were the first step toward the cashless society and that 
they were entering that business in order to be prepared for what they saw as an 
inevitable future (Bátiz-Lazo et al., 2014). 
There were also a number of less successful attempts that, far from being 
relegated to the ignominy of the business archives, offer an important insight into the 
implementation of a cashless economy which is worth preserving for future 
generations of managers and scholars. Chief amongst these is a system widely 
deployed by the alliance of U.S. savings and loans (S&L) with mid-sized retailers 
under the sobriquet “Hinky Dinky”. Interestingly, Maixé-Altés (2012, 213-214) offers 
an account of a similar, independent, and contemporary experiment in, a very 
different context, Spain. The Hinky Dinky moniker was derived from an experiment 
by the Nebraskan First Federal Savings and Loan Association, which in 1974 located 
computer terminals into stores of the Hinky Dinky grocery chain - which at its apex 
operated some 50 stores across Iowa and Nebraska. The Hinky Dinky chain was 
seen by the First Federal Savings and Loan Association as the perfect retail partner 
for this experiment owing to the supermarket’s popularity with local customers; an 
appeal that would be beneficial to this new technology. The popularity of Hinky Dinky 
was particularly valuable, as the move by First Federal Savings and Loans, to 
establish an offsite transfer system challenged, but did not break banking law at that 
time (Ritzer, 1984).  
At the heart of the technical EFT system initiated by First Federal, formally 
known as Transmatic Money Service, was a rudimentary, easy-to-install package 
featuring a point-of- service machine, with limited accessory equipment in the form of 
a keypad and magnetic character reader. The terminal housed in a dedicated booth 
within the store and was operated by store employees (making a further point of the 
separation between bank and retailer). The terminal enabled the verification and 
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recording of transactions as well as the instant updating of accounts.  The 
deployment of the terminals in Hinky Dinky stores shocked the financial industry 
because it made the Nebraska S&L appear to be engaging in banking activities, 
while the terminals themselves provided banking services to customers in a location 
that was not a licensed bank branch!   
From its origins in a mid-sized retail chain in the Midwest, some 160 “Hinky 
Dinky” networks appeared across the USA between 1974 and 1982, before S&Ls 
abandoned them in favour of ATMs and credit cards. These deployments included a 
roll out in 1980 by the largest savings banks by assets in the USA at the time, the 
Philadelphia Savings Fund Society or the PSFS. Rather than commit to the large 
capital investment that ATMs necessitated, without guarantees of its viability or a 
secure return on investment, the PSFS pivoted the “Hinky Dinky” terminals as part of 
the rolled out of its negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts (commercialised 
as “Act One”).  
The NOW accounts were launched in the early 1970s by the Consumer 
Savings Bank, based in Worcester, MA (today part of USBank), as way to 
circumvent the ban on interest payment and current account deposits imposed on 
S&Ls by Depression era regulation. Between 1974 and 1980, Congress took 
incremental steps to allow NOW accounts nationwide, something the PSFS wanted 
to take advantage of. Consequently, in February 1979, the PSFS signed an 
agreement with the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (A&P) to install 
Transmatic Money Service devices in 12 supermarket locations. This was part of the 
PSFS wider strategy “to provide alternative means for delivering banking services to 
the public” (Hagley Archives: PSFS Collection).  
 These terminals did not, however, allow for the direct transfer of funds from 
the customer’s accounts to the retailers. Rather the terminals, which were operated 
by A&P employees, were activated by a PSFS plastic card that the society issued to 
customers, and enabled PSFS customers with a Payment and Savings account to 
make withdrawals and deposits.  The terminals also allowed PSFS cardholders and 
A&P customers to cash cheques.  
The equipment used by PSFS, the Hinky Dinky devices, therefore represent 
an interesting middle ground which improved transaction convenience for 
consumers, was low risk for the retailer and was relatively less costly for banks and 
financial institutions than ATMs (Benaroch & Kauffman, 2000).   
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One of the most interesting features of the Hinky Dinky terminals as they were 
deployed by the PSFS and First Federal Savings, was that they represent co-
operative initiatives between retail organisations and financial institutions. As 
mentioned before, this was not necessarily the norm at the time. As the legal counsel 
to the National Retail Merchants Association (a voluntary non-profit trade association 
representing department, speciality and variety chain stores) wrote in 1972: “Major 
retailers… have not been EFTS laggards. However, their efforts have not necessarily 
or even particularly been channelled toward co-operative ventures with banks,” 
(Schuman, 1976, 828). These sentiments were echoed by more neutral 
commentators who similarly highlighted the lack of dialogue between retailers and 
financial institutions on the topic of EFTS (Sprague, 1974). The extent to which 
retailers provided financial services to their customers had long been a competitive 
issue in the retail industry: the ability of chain stores, such as A&P in groceries and 
F.W. Woolworth in general merchandise, to offer low prices and better value owed 
much to their elimination of credit and deliveries (Lebhar, 1952). With the advent of 
EFT retail organisation’s provision of financial services raised the prospect of this 
becoming a competitive issue between these two industries. 
The prospect of a clash between retailers and banks was increased 
moreover, as there had always been other voices, other retailers, who had been 
willing to offer credit (Calder, 1999). In the early years of the 20th century, consumer 
demand for retailers to provide credit grew. This caused tension with the cash only 
policies of department store such as A.T. Stewart and Macy’s, and the mail order 
firms Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward (Howard, 2015). Nevertheless, it was 
hard to ignore such demand as evidenced by Sears decision to begin selling goods 
on instalment around 1911 (Emmet and Jeuck, 1950, 265). Twenty years later, in 
1931, the company went a stage further by offering insurance products to consumers 
through the All State Insurance Company. Other large retail institutions, however, 
resisted the pressure to offer credit until much later (J.C. Penney for instance would 
not introduce credit until 1958). Credit activities by large retailers, nonetheless, were 
determinant for banks to explore their own credit cards as early as the 1940s while 
leading to the successes of Bankamericacard and the Interbank Association in the 
1960s (Bátiz-Lazo and del Angel, 2018; Wolters, 2000).   
The barriers between banks and financial institutions on the one hand, and 
retailers on the other, continued to remain fairly robust. Signs that this was beginning 
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to change began to emerge in the 1980s, when retailers, such as Sears began to 
offer more complex financial products (Christiansen, 1987; Ghemawat, 1984; Raff 
and Temin, 1997). Yet, the more concerted activity by retailers to diversify into 
financial services, would ultimately be stimulated by food retailers (Martinelli and 
Sparks, 1999; Colgate and Alexander, 2002). The Hinky Dinky System however 
shows that a co-operative not just a competitive solution was a very real possibility.    
In 2021 we are witnessing an extreme extension and intensification of these 
trends. Throughout the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, the use of cash has greatly 
declined as more and more people switch to digital payments. In the retail industry, 
even before the pandemic, POS innovations were becoming increasingly digital 
(Reinartz and Imschloβ, 2017) as retailers shifted toward a concierge model of 
helping customers rather than simply focusing on processing transactions and 
delivering products (Brynjolfsson et al., 2013). Consequently, the retail-customer 
interface was already starting to shift away from one that prioritised the minimisation 
of transaction and information costs toward an interface which prioritised customer 
engagement and experience (Reinartz et al., 2019).  
A second feature of the pandemic has been the massive increase in interest 
in crypto currencies, in its many different forms, around the world. This is most 
apparent in the volatility and fluctuations in price of Bitcoin, but is also evident in the 
increased prominence of alternative fiat currencies (such as Ether). Indeed, even 
central banks in Europe and North America are discussing digital currencies, the 
government of El Salvador has made Bitcoin legal tender, while the People’s Bank of 
China have launched their own digital currency in China. A further manifestation of 
the momentum crypto currencies are gaining include the private initiatives of big tech 
(such as Facebook’s Diem, formerly Libra). Yet, in spite of all of this latent promise, 
transactions at point of sale with crypto currencies are still minuscule and time and 
again, surveys by central banks on payment preferences consistently report people 
want paper money to continue to play its historic role. 
It thus remains too early to forecast with any degree of certainty what the 
actual long-run effects of the virus, social distancing and lockdowns will have on the 
use of cash, how consumers acquire products and services, and what these 
products and services are. It is also uncertain whether and if greater use of crypto 
currencies will lead to a decentralised management of monetary policy (and if so, the 
rate at which this will take place). It is though almost certain that consumer’s 
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behaviours, expectations and habits will have been altered by their personal 
experiences of Covid. In this context the story behind “Hinky Dinky” reminds us to be 
sober at a time of environmental turbulence and wary of extrapolating trends, to 
better understand the motivation driving the adoption of new payment technology as 
some of these trends, like “Hinky Dinky”, might look to have wide acceptance but to 
result in a short-term phenomenon.       
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